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Implications of Azar v. Allina Health Services on
Rulemaking: How to Know When Notice and Comment
is Required Under the Medicare Act
Hell hath no fury
Like a woman scorned or a
Hospital cheated

I. I NTRODUCTION
In Azar v. Allina Health Services, the Supreme Court held in a 7–1
decision that the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)
could not unilaterally change the reimbursement formula that dictates how
much providers are paid for services rendered to individuals covered by
Medicare.1 HHS claimed that it was an interpretive rule change that could
be done unilaterally, while the hospitals argued that the Medicare Act
required HHS to engage in a notice-and-comment session before making
the change.2 The Supreme Court agreed with the hospitals.3
This ruling has caused some serious heartburn for HHS. The result of
Azar v. Allina Health Services is that more rules promulgated by HHS will
need to go through the notice-and-comment process, a process that
agencies typically avoid at all costs. Despite HHS’ pain, the larger problem
is the confusion that has been introduced into the marketplace. As neither
hospitals nor HHS are sure what needs to go through the notice-andcomment process, there exists some market uncertainty regarding the
efficacy of new rules.
This paper reviews the holding of Azar v. Allina Health Services
(hereinafter “Allina II”),4 looks to previous tests used by courts under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to determine whether a rule was
1. 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1804 (2019).
2. Id. at 1811.
3. Id.
4. Some papers have begun referring to this decision as Allina II, and I have adopted this
shorthand. Allina I, for those who are curious, is the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in a 2014 case involving the
2004 attempt by Medicaid to change the reimbursement formula. E.g., Josh Armstrong, Comment,
Necessary “Procedures”: Making Sense of the Medicare Act’s Notice-and-Comment Requirement, 87
U. CHI. L. REV. 2175, 2177 (2020); Lee Nutini, Supreme Court Will Review Allina II DSH Part C
Decision to Resolve Circuit Split on Medicare Rulemaking Requirements, JDSUPRA (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-will-review-allina-ii-dsh-89898/ (last visited Apr.
28, 2021).
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substantive or not, examines lower court holdings regarding the
substantive boundary under the Medicare Act, and then proposes a test to
help hospitals determine whether a rule is substantive in nature and
therefore requires the notice-and-comment process.

II. T HE A DMINISTRATIVE P ROCEDURE A CT
As will be shown in the next section, the main principle in Allina II is
that the Medicare Act is not the same as the APA. Because Allina II is so
focused on the differences between the Medicare Act and the APA, a quick
summary of the history and pertinent requirements under the APA is
appropriate.
In 1933 Franklin Roosevelt became President of the United States with
a “New Deal” plan that would end the Great Depression through intense
regulations5 and government spending. To implement his plan, he created
and relied on new government agencies, headed by his trusty aide James
Landis.6 He created so many new agencies that his critics (and possibly
even his supporters) referred to the acronym-bearing entities as an
“alphabet soup.”7
The New Deal was a massive expansion “of federal agency
involvement in people’s lives” and “an across-the-board retreat from
constitutional doctrines of federalism and separation of powers that had
foreclosed the emergence of an activist administrative state.”8 This
expansion caused individuals to worry the government had become too
powerful and invasive. After a decade of fierce debate over the size and
nature of the administrative state, the APA was created, passing
unanimously.9 The APA was designed to regulate the regulators by
providing boundaries and safeguards. It reflects the tension between the
ideals of an efficient administrative state and an accountable one.
The APA provides multiple methods for agencies to promulgate rules.
One such method is referred to as “informal rulemaking.”10 Under this
5. For example, FDR created various Codes of Fair Competition for industries. These codes
were very granular and focused on the smallest industries possible. In one instance, instead of lumping
the production of foodstuffs as the “food industry,” he would regulate the “poultry industry”
specifically. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521 (1935).
6. Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 319
(1964).
7. TONYA BOLDEN, FDR’S ALPHABET SOUP: NEW DEAL AMERICA, 1932–1939, 36 (2010).
8. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 322 (8th ed. 2019).
9. Id. at 323.
10. Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO STATE L.J. 237, 238-39
(2014).
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method, an agency must publish the proposed rule and give the public time
to comment on the proposed rule.11 As one can imagine, this “notice-andcomment” method of creating rules takes significant time and effort by the
agencies.
The APA provides for several exemptions that agencies can use to
avoid the notice-and-comment requirements. One such exemption is for
“interpretative rules,” in which an agency does not need to promulgate a
new rule through the notice-and-comment process if its statement is
merely interpreting existing rules or statutes.12 Another exemption is for
“rules of agency organization, procedure, and practice.”13 A third
exemption is for “general statements of policy” that agencies can give as
guidance to regulated parties.14 Agencies, in their attempts to avoid the
notice-and-comment requirements, have often stretched the boundaries of
what sort of guidance can be considered to be interpretive, procedural, or
a policy statement. Many cases hinge on whether a rule is substantive15
(thus requiring notice and comment) or is interpretive, procedural, or a
policy statement (thus avoiding notice and comment).
Of particular importance is the fact that the APA is only the default
for governing agency actions. Statutes can specifically provide for
different standards and procedures. Thus, although a statute may require
an agency to go through a notice-and-comment procedure, that
requirement may be separate from the APA and therefore not governed by
APA case law. This distinction is of particular importance in Allina II.

III. A ZAR V . A LLINA H EALTH S ERVICES
The debate over the line between substantive and nonsubstantive
Medicare rules reached the Supreme Court in Azar v. Allina Health
Services in 2019.16 The government has traditionally given extra Medicare
payments to hospitals that serve low-income patients. The payment
amount is determined by the hospital’s “Medicare fraction.” “The
numerator is the time the hospital spent caring for Part-A-entitled patients
who were also entitled to income support payments under the Social
Security Act,” while the “denominator is the time the hospital spent caring
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). Interpretative rules are often referred to as “interpretive.”
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. It is worth noting that this paper uses the terms “substantive rules” and “legislative rules”
interchangeably.
16. Azar v. Allina Health Services, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1804 (2019).
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for patients who were ‘entitled to benefits under’ Medicare Part A.”17
Justice Gorsuch summed up the result of this costly arithmetic by stating,
“[t]he bigger the fraction, the bigger the payment.”18
As any fifth grader studying fractions could tell you, there are two
ways to decrease a fraction—you decrease the numerator or increase the
denominator. The government, mindful of the looming insolvency of the
Medicare trust fund,19 sought to decrease the Medicare fraction and the
resulting Medicare payments by increasing the denominator. To increase
the denominator, the government tried to include Medicare Part C patients
as patients who were entitled to benefits under Medicare Part A. As “Part
C enrollees . . . tend to be wealthier than patients who opt for traditional
Part A coverage. . . . counting them makes the fraction smaller and reduces
hospitals’ payments considerably—by between $3 billion and $4 billion
over a 9-year period, according to the government.”20
Originally, HHS had not included Part C patients in the Medicare
fraction. It promulgated a rule in 2004 that attempted to include them, but
the Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, vacated that rule.21 In response to these
legal developments, HHS issued a new, still pending rule in 2013 that
prospectively would count Part C patients in the Medicare fraction.22
The pertinent dispute in Allina II arose in 2014, when HHS calculated
the Medicare fractions for the 2012 fiscal year.23 HHS still wanted to
decrease costs, but it could not rely on the pending 2013 rule or the vacated
2004 rule.24 To get around this, the agency “posted on a website a
spreadsheet announcing the 2012 Medicare fractions for 3,500 hospitals
nationwide and noting that the fractions included Part C patients.”25 In
response to the change, the hospitals brought this action.
The Supreme Court sided with the hospitals and held that the noticeand-comment process was required. The relevant statutory language that
governed the dispute is in 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2), which is part of the
Medicare Act. It requires the government to provide notice and an

17. Id. at 1809.
18. Id.
19. Rebecca Pifer, CBO Finds COVID-19 Puts Medicare Trust Fund Insolvency Just 4 Years
Away, HEALTHCAREDIVE (Sept. 4, 2020) https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cbo-finds-covid-19puts-medicare-trust-fund-insolvency-just-4-years-away/584725/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
20. Azar, 139 S. Ct. at 1809.
21. Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
22. Azar, 139 S. Ct. at 1810.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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opportunity to comment on any “rule, requirement, or other statement of
policy . . . that establishes or changes a substantive legal standard
governing . . . the payment for services.”26
In defense of its unilateral change, the agency argued that (1) §
1395hh(a)(2) differentiated substantive legal standards from interpretive
legal standards, (2) the change was an interpretive rule, and therefore (3)
no notice-and-comment process was required.27 The hospitals suggested
that “the statute means to distinguish a substantive from a procedural legal
standard.”28 The Supreme Court stated that “[s]everal statutory clues
persuade us of at least one thing: The government’s interpretation can’t be
right.”29
The Supreme Court determined that the Medicare Act does not use the
word “‘substantive’ in the same way as the APA.” “[T]he Medicare Act
contemplates that ‘statements of policy’ like the one at issue here can
establish or change a ‘substantive legal standard’ . . . . . Yet, by definition
under the APA, statements of policy are not substantive; instead they are
grouped with and treated as interpretive rules.”30 Another indication that
the Medicare Act does not use the word “substantive” like the APA does
is that Congress did not reference the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements when it wrote § 1395hh(a)(2) even though it specifically
referenced the APA in other provisions of the Medicare Act.31
The majority opinion pointedly declined to glean a meaning out of
legislative history that was “ambiguous at best.”32 It also refuted the
government’s policy argument that a broad notice-and-comment
requirement would be too onerous, as “the government failed to document
any draconian costs associated with notice and comment.”33 The majority
notably praised the benefits of the notice-and-comment system, as it
provides fair warning to affected parties and “affords the agency a chance
to avoid errors and make a more informed decision.”34 The Supreme Court
summarized its ruling by stating that,
In the end, all of the available evidence persuades us that the phrase
“substantive legal standard,” which appears in § 13955hh(a)(2) and
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Azar, 139 S. Ct. at 1811.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1813.
Id. at 1814.
Id. at 1816.
Id.
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apparently nowhere else in the U.S. Code, cannot bear the same
construction as the term “substantive rule” in the APA. We need not,
however, go so far as to say that the hospitals’ interpretation, adopted by
the court of appeals, is correct in every particular. To affirm the judgment
before us, it is enough to say the government’s arguments for reversal
fail to withstand scrutiny. Other questions about the statute’s meaning
can await other cases. The dissent would like us to provide more
guidance . . . but the briefing before us focused on the issue whether the
Medicare Act borrows the APA’s interpretive-rule exception, and we
limit our holding accordingly. In doing so, we follow the well-worn path
of declining “to issue a sweeping ruling when a narrow one will do.”35

This case has several implications. First, based on the high praise
given to the notice-and-comment process, it is clear that the Supreme
Court prefers for HHS to go through the notice-and-comment process as
it makes changes.36 Second, the threshold requirement for an agency action
to need the notice-and-comment process is different under the Medicare
Act than it is under the APA. Third, the threshold is much lower under the
Medicare Act. Fourth, it is unclear how much lower that threshold is.
Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically declined to give a bright line
standard, or any standard at all, as to when notice and comment is required.
Fifth, while the Supreme Court stated that the line between substantive and
interpretive rules under the Medicare Act does not track the boundary in
the APA, it did not state whether the Medicare Act similarly rejected the
APA boundary between substantive and procedural rules.37

IV. P RIOR M ETHODS OF D ETERMINING WHEN R ULES R EQUIRE
N OTICE AND C OMMENT
A. APA Cases
With the unmooring of the Medicare Act from the APA’s boundary
between substantive and interpretive rules, parties involved in the
Medicare industry are left with a vaguer standard to determine when notice
and comment is needed. A quick review38 of methods lower courts have
used to determine what an interpretive rule or policy statement is under
35. Id. at 1814 (quoting McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1800 (2017)).
36. Id. at 1816.
37. Id. at 1811.
38. The complexity of these cases cannot be understated, and the following case summaries
have deliberately sacrificed some completeness for parsimony, as the purpose of this paper is to give
suggestions about what hospitals can do in the future, not to contain an exhaustive treatise on
interpretive rules under the APA.
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the APA provides context and guidance as to what sort of standards
hospitals and the HHS should rely on going forward when interpreting the
Medicare Act.
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has not issued a standard,
either under the APA or the Medicare Act, regarding whether a rule is
substantive, interpretive, or a statement of policy. In 2015 the Court
pointedly declined to “wade into that debate.”39 The Court only stated “that
the critical feature of interpretive rules is that they are ‘issued by an agency
to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers.’”40 This definition does not give much aid in divining
whether a rule is interpretive or not. As such, the lower courts have
invented multiple tests in attempts to solve this problem.
The “legal effects” test was used in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC
by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”)
to determine whether the notice-and-comment procedure should have been
used by the Federal Power Commission when it made its decision as to
which customers would be given higher priority to receive natural gas in
the event of a shortage.41 The court held that notice and comment was not
required. The court described the difference between a substantive rule
and a general statement of policy by holding that “[a] properly adopted
substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct . . . . A general statement
of policy, on the other hand, does not establish a ‘binding norm.’ It is not
finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed.”42 The
legal effects test was not without flaws. Professor Gary Lawson pointed
out that because regulated parties go to great lengths to comply with
agency policy statements, the “practical effect of such rules on regulated
parties may be hard to distinguish from the practical effect of legislative
rules.”43 This test is still in use.44
In American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health
Administration, Judge Williams created a new variant of the legal effects
test with his own four-prong test. While Judge Williams later changed this

39. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015).
40. Id. at 97 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
41. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 38 (quoting Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in
Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 597–98 (1951)).
43. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 446.
44. Id. at 447 n.43.
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four-part test by eliminating the second prong,45 the original test he used
is still instructive. He wrote,
Accordingly, insofar as our cases can be reconciled at all, we think it
almost exclusively on the basis of whether the purported interpretive rule
has “legal effect”, which in turn is best ascertained by asking (1) whether
in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis
for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure
the performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has published the rule
in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3) whether the agency has explicitly
invoked its general legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule
effectively amends a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any of these
questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive rule.46

Another test used was the “substantial impact” test, which mainly
asked “whether the agency action had an impact on the rights and interests
of private parties.”47 The substantial impact test was widely used as a way
to stop agencies from circumventing the legal effects test.48 However, the
Supreme Court decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council49 was widely read as a rejection of the
substantial impact test, and the test is no longer used.50
The venerable Judge Laurence Silberman in United States Telephone
Association v. FCC (D.C. Cir.) used the “impact on agencies” test to
determine that the FCC had unlawfully created its forfeiture standards.51
The impact on agencies test focused on whether the agency was bound to
its alleged policy statement.52 The court held that the agency was bound to
its alleged policy statement, as the agency had departed from the policy
only once in over 300 cases.53 The court held that this reliance was
conclusive evidence that the alleged policy statement was actually a
substantive rule.54 In short, the agency was too bound by its own policy
for the rule to be anything but substantive.
In Syncor International Corp. v. Shalala, the D.C. Circuit applied the
American Mining legal effects test but with a strong emphasis on the third
45. Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded Them Offer
Insight into the Procedural Inquiry?, B.U. L. REV. 1303, 1315 (2010).
46. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
47. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
48. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 446.
49. 98 S.Ct. 1197 (1978).
50. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 447.
51. United States Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 1234.
53. Id. at 1235.
54. Id.
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prong—whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative
authority.55 The court held that the FDA should have gone through the
notice-and-comment procedure because its alleged interpretive rule “does
not purport to construe any language in a relevant statute or regulation.”56
The alleged interpretive rule could not be interpretive because it was not
interpreting anything at all—the only regulation it had relied on for its
“interpretation” was the FDA’s general power to regulate the industry.57
B. Medicare Act Cases
A few recent cases involving interpretive rules under the notice-andcomment requirements in the Medicare Act similarly prove instructive. In
2017 the D.C. Circuit held in Clarian Health West, LLC v. Hargan that the
Medicare Act did not require HHS to go through the notice-and-comment
process for a 2010 manual that included instructions for the reconciliation
selection criteria for outlier payments.58 The court concluded that the
manual instructions embody a general statement of policy, not a legislative
rule, and consequently did not need to be made through the notice-andcomment process. The court summarized its test as follows:
Our case law sets out “two lines of inquiry” to guide the determination
of whether an action constitutes a legislative rule or a general statement
of policy. “One line of analysis considers the effects of an agency’s
action, inquiring whether the agency has ‘(1) impose[d] any rights and
obligations, or (2) genuinely [left] the agency and its decisionmakers free
to exercise discretion.’” The second “looks to the agency’s expressed
intentions,” including “consideration of three factors: ‘(1) the [a]gency’s
own characterization of the action; (2) whether the action was published
in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations; and (3)
whether the action has binding effects on private parties or on the
agency.’” As we have noted, the two lines of analysis overlap at the
inquiry into whether the action has binding effect, and we have
consistently emphasized that this factor is the most important.59

In 2019 the District Court for the D.C. Circuit heard Select Specialty
Hospital-Denver, Inc. v. Azar.60 Without undergoing the notice-andcomment process, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Clarian Health W., LLC v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
Select Specialty Hosp.-Denver, Inc. v. Azar, 391 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2019).
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(“CMS”), an agency within HHS, began requiring hospitals to obtain a
State Remittance Advice (basically, a form from the state Medicaid
program) and submit it before filing for “reimbursement for dual-eligible
patients’ bad debt.”61 The court acknowledged that this resembled an
administrative or procedural requirement, especially considering that it did
not change the amount of money owed to providers.62 However, the court
held that it was a substantive change, like the change in Allina II, because
“CMS changed not just the steps that existing LTCHs must take, vis-à-vis
CMS, to be reimbursed, but also changed whether such entities must form
contracts with third parties, the state Medicaid programs.”63 Because this
“essentially changed the eligibility criteria for reimbursement” by
“requiring provider participation in the state Medicaid program,” it was
deemed a substantive change.64 The court concluded that this was the sort
of “bureaucratic nightmare” that Congress likely sought to avoid by
enacting the notice-and-comment requirements of the Medicare Act.65
The third case that provides another data point for drawing the
interpretive rule boundary line is Polansky v. Executive Health Resources,
Inc.66 The District Court of Pennsylvania directly adopted the D.C.
Circuit’s definition of a substantive legal standard as “a standard that
creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties,”
which was the standard that the “Supreme Court stated it was neither
adopting nor rejecting.”67 The court tried to reconcile the decisions made
by the D.C. Circuit in Allina II and Clarian by stating that
If a policy affects the right to, or amount of reimbursement, it is more
likely to be deemed a “substantive legal standard” . . . . [I]f a policy does
not affect the authority of CMS, but simply provides instructions for
enforcement, it is more likely not to be characterized as a “substantive
legal standard.”68

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
Id. at 934 (quoting Allina Health Servs. v. Price, 863 F.3d 937, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
Id. at 934–35.
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V. S UGGESTIONS FROM THE A CADEMIC C OMMUNITY
One of the most thorough articles on Allina II is a law review article
by Josh Armstrong, a J.D. candidate at the University of Chicago.69 He
argues that courts should clarify the distinction between substantive and
nonsubstantive rules by looking to existing case law regarding the APA’s
procedural exemption to notice-and-comment rules. He argues that this
reading would bring immediate clarity and would likely be acceptable “as
Allina [II] never expressly rules out the possibility that the Medicare
statute in effect borrows that exemption.”70
His argument is not without flaws. First, the Medicare Act does not
cross-reference the procedural rule exemption in the APA.71 Mr.
Armstrong does provide several possible reasons that the drafters of the
Medicare Act chose not to make this cross-reference, such as the fact that
the APA notice-and-comment provision is defined in negative language to
which rules are not subject, while the Medicare Act is framed with positive
language (to which rules are subject).72 However, in Allina II, the Supreme
Court found the lack of a cross-reference to the APA’s interpretive
exemption to be significant evidence that the line between substantive and
interpretive rules was different in the Medicare Act than in the APA.73 As
such, despite Mr. Armstrong’s good reasons, the lack of a cross-reference
to the interpretive rule exemption would presumably again signal to the
Court that the APA procedural exemption was not to be strictly borrowed
in the Medicare Act. Second, Mr. Armstrong’s underlying assumption is
that the notice-and-comment requirements are a “burden.”74 The Supreme
Court clearly feels differently, as it has held that the notice-and-comment
process “affords the agency a chance to avoid errors and make a more
informed decision.”75 As such, it is likely that the Supreme Court would
not approve a wholesale adoption of the APA procedural exemption given
that it prefers for Medicare, “a program where even minor changes to the
agency’s approach can impact millions of people and billions of dollars in
ways that are not always easy for regulators to anticipate,” to have a tighter

69. Josh Armstrong, Comment, Necessary “Procedures”: Making Sense of the Medicare Act’s
Notice-and-Comment Requirement, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 2175 (2020).
70. Id. at 2178.
71. Id. at 2201.
72. Id.
73. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1813 (2019).
74. Armstrong, supra note 69, at 2185, 2211.
75. Azar, 139 S. Ct. at 1816.
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regulatory leash.76 It seems more likely that the Supreme Court would rule
similarly to Allina II and hold that the procedural rule exemption to notice
and comment under the Medicare Act is a higher bar to clear than it is
under the APA.
Two other academics, Allison Cohen and Tesch West, speculate that
the pre-Allina II case Clarian Health West, LLC v. Hargan gives an
indication as to how the Supreme Court might rule in future cases.77 Cohen
and West speculate that the difference in how the D.C. Circuit ruled in
Allina II (ruling that the payment changes required notice and comment)
and in Clarian (holding that notice and comment was not required)
seems to be whether the agency’s action (i) creates a new legal standard
affecting payment, benefits, or eligibility that was not articulated in and
cannot be reasonably derived from a prior rule that has gone through
notice-and-comment rulemaking (Allina [II]) or (ii) simply explains how
to apply an existing legal standard that already has gone through noticeand-comment rulemaking (Clarian).78

Their prediction is that in the future,
If a policy or manual guidance cannot be directly derived from a statute
or prior regulation, but establishes or changes Medicare payment, scope
of benefits, or eligibility, there is a strong argument that it should fall
under the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment requirements, even if it
could be exempt as an interpretive rule under the APA’s rulemaking
requirements.79

This article, while brief, is very cogent. Clarian was decided by the
D.C. Circuit, the same circuit court whose ruling was affirmed in Allina
II. Because the D.C. Circuit was correct in the boundary line in Allina II80
and is typically viewed as the second most important court in the United
States,81 Clarian carries significant predictive value. The distinctions
drawn by Cohen and West seem reasonable and do offer some predictive
value.

76. Id.
77. Allison Cohen & Tesch West, Supreme Court Holds that Under the Medicare Act Certain
CMS Policy Statements Require Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, 21 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE
55, 57 (2019).
78. Id. at 57–58.
79. Id. at 59.
80. Azar, 139 S. Ct. at 1805.
81. Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review—Reviewed: The Second Most Important Court?,
YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sep 4, 2015), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuitreview-reviewed-the-second-most-important-court-by-aaron-nielson/.
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VI. P ROPOSED “S IMPLE S UBSTANTIVE TEST ”
A. Simple Substantive Test
As is shown by the variety of legal tests used under both the APA and
the Medicare Act, there is no consensus about what the “best” test is to
determine the boundary between substantive and nonsubstantive rules.
Indeed, there is no perfect test. Substantive boundary tests must be applied
in a variety of situations, and this wide application means that each test
has unique strengths and weaknesses. This paper makes no claim to have
created the perfect test. Rather, this paper proposes a “rule of thumb” test
that courts can use in determining whether a rule was unlawfully
promulgated under the Medicare Act. This test is simple and would
provide much needed guidance for CMS and for hospitals.
As the D.C. Circuit’s decision was upheld by the Supreme Court, it
seems reasonable to adopt the D.C. Circuit’s definition of a substantive
legal standard as “a standard that ‘creates, defines, and regulates the rights,
duties, and powers of parties.’”82 However, this overarching standard is
still somewhat nebulous. As such, a more specific test would be more
useful for courts who are seeking to apply the D.C. Circuit’s definition.
In determining whether a rule is a substantive legal standard, courts
should ask the following questions. First, is there a substantial financial
impact from the new rule? Second, does the rule require hospitals to enter
into new contracts? Third, is the rule grounded in a rule passed by
Congress or in a rule already passed through the notice-and-comment
process? A weighing of the answers to the above questions will give courts
a simple method to determine whether the rule was unlawfully created.
For ease of use, these questions will be referred to as the “simple
substantive” test. If a hospital finds that it has experienced a substantial
financial impact, or has been required to enter into new contracts, or that
the rule is not grounded in legislative or other regulatory rules, the court
should presume that the rule is unconstitutional. While this presumption
can be rebutted after further analysis of the situation, it is a useful and
simple starting point not only for the courts but also for the regulated
parties.

82. Allina Health Servs. v. Price, 863 F.3d 937, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Substantive
Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
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B. Substantial Financial and Contractual Impact
The first prong is whether there is a substantial financial impact from
the new rule. This is somewhat of a paradigm shift. Many tests, such as
the “impact on agencies” test, focus on the effect of the rule on the agency.
Indeed, much of administrative law focuses on how the agency passes a
rule rather than on the substance or impact of that rule.83 A paradigm shift
in this prong seems appropriate because the definition used by the D.C.
Circuit focuses on the “rights, duties, and powers of parties,” which
includes the regulated parties. The right to own money and property was
one of the rights fought for in the American Revolution, and much of the
federal Constitution protects that right from government overreach.84 As
this is a critical right, it is appropriate to have a prong that uses money as
a proxy to measure how much the government is overstepping its bounds.
The second prong similarly is a paradigm shift but focuses on the
impact felt by the hospitals on their right and freedom to contract. This
was a critical part of the analysis in Select Specialty, in which the District
Court noted with disapproval that the substantive CMS policy required the
hospitals to contract with and participate in state Medicare programs.85 As
the right to contract86 is a fundamental right that courts have typically been
solicitous of,87 it is of little surprise that the District Court took care to
strike down CMS’ attempt to unilaterally force hospitals to contract with
certain third parties. As that case is one of the few on point in this area of
the law, a prong focusing on contracts seems worthy of inclusion in the
simple substantive test.
It is worth noting that these first two prongs both resemble the
“substantial impact” that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Vermont
Yankee.88 However, Vermont Yankee dealt with the standard under the
APA, not the Medicare Act. Additionally, the Medicare Act decisions
seem to be trending towards something resembling the substantial impact
test. The Supreme Court in Allina II found the amount of money involved
in the Medicare Act to be a significant part of its analysis. Additionally,
83. E.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
84. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (the Takings Clause).
85. Select Specialty Hosp.-Denver, Inc. v. Azar, 391 F. Supp. 3d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2019).
86. The right to contract includes not only the ability to enter into contracts but also the ability
to choose who to enter into contracts with, as well as the ability to set terms.
87. The right to contract has long been part of American law and was derived from England.
Perhaps the greatest example of the importance of the right to contract is the hesitation courts show to
void contracts made by parties. They typically only do so when there is clear fraud or a party is deemed
incapable of making a contract.
88. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 447.
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the D.C. Circuit focused its definition on “the rights, duties, and powers”
of the regulated parties under the Medicare Act. As such, it seems
appropriate to focus on whether the promulgated rule had a substantial
impact on the rights of the regulated parties.
It also seems appropriate to focus the analysis on the financial impact
and contracting impact instead of on whether substantial impact is felt in
any area by hospitals. The right to protect one’s property and money from
government interference is a fundamental right under the federal
Constitution and played a significant role in Allina II. The right to contract
has also long been viewed as a fundamental right89 and was the crux of the
matter in Select Specialty. Thus, it is reasonable to focus the simple
substantive test on the impact felt in those two areas. While it is possible
to group the two prongs together under a more general heading of “Is the
government changing any key rights?,” that question is too broad and
nebulous to actually be of use to courts.
C. Legal Justification
The third prong is whether the rule is grounded in a rule passed by
Congress or in a rule already passed through the notice-and-comment
process. This rule borrows somewhat from the first prong of Judge
Williams’ American Mining test, which asked in part “whether in the
absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for
enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the
performance of duties.”90 This prong is part of the simple substantive test
because of the strong preference demonstrated by the Supreme Court
towards the notice-and-comment procedure in Allina II. The Supreme
Court stated that the notice-and-comment process is vitally important as it
provides fair warning to affected parties and “affords the agency a chance
to avoid errors and make a more informed decision.”91
This strong preference indicates that the Supreme Court prefers for
rules to be made via notice and comment whenever possible. It also
indicates that rules not made by that preference are more suspect in the
eyes of the Supreme Court. As such, if a rule is not thoroughly grounded
in legislative laws or rules made via notice and comment, it is more likely
that the promulgated rule will be deemed to be substantive.

89. David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 52 (2013).
90. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
91. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1816 (2019).
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D. Ignored Prior Tests
It is worth noting what tests were not incorporated into the proposed
simple substantive test. The most prominent one that is missing is whether
the promulgated rule has “legal effects.” This question is the standard
applied in Pacific Gas and American Mining, two APA cases, and is still
used today. There are two reasons that this test was not incorporated into
my proposed Medicare Act test. First, as Professor Gary Lawson has
pointed out, the legal effects test still allows agencies to regulate through
threat using policy statements because regulated parties go to great lengths
to comply with policy statements.92 Second, the test is hard to
operationalize, as seen through the amount of variants that have been
created of the legal effects test. Third, some prongs of Judge Williams’
American Mining test, such as whether the rule is grounded in a legislative
rule, are already incorporated into the above test.
The other prominent test that was not incorporated into the simple
substantive test is the “impact on agencies” test from United States
Telephone. This test was excluded because the test requires a significant
sample size of agency action. In United States Telephone, the Supreme
Court reviewed over 300 cases to determine whether the agency was
bound to the rule.93 Requiring a large sample size, by default, requires
regulated parties to be regulated for a significant amount of time before
challenging the action. It is more efficient to have a test that can be used
to determine whether to challenge an agency action before the rule takes
effect.

VII. C ONCLUSION
In Allina II, the Supreme Court made clear that the APA boundary
between substantive and nonsubstantive legal standards does not apply to
the substantive boundary under the Medicare Act. This has caused some
confusion in the Medicare industry. To ameliorate this confusion, this
paper proposes a “rule of thumb” to aid hospitals in their decision-making.
This “simple substantive test” consists of three prongs. First, is there a
substantial financial impact from the new rule? Second, does the rule
require hospitals to enter into new contracts? Third, is the rule grounded
in a rule passed by Congress or in a rule already passed through the noticeand-comment process? If a court finds that the rule has a substantial
92. LAWSON, supra note 8, at 446.
93. U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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financial impact, requires hospitals to enter into new contracts, or is not
grounded in legislative or other regulatory rules, the court should presume
that the rule is unlawful.
To be clear, this is not an easy question to answer. Judge Laurence
Silberman himself stated that “the distinction between the two types of
agency pronouncements has not proved an easy one to draw . . . .” If there
were an easy solution, there would be no need for this paper. However,
these suggestions may still prove useful to give not only courts but also
CMS and hospitals an idea of the shadowy boundary between when notice
and comment is required and when it is not.
In the long run, the Supreme Court’s decision to require more rules to
go through the notice-and-comment procedure will be useful for the
healthcare industry. It may sacrifice some speed in creating regulations,
but the greater industry input will lead to more tailored rules. More tailored
rules will lead to decreased healthcare costs, as hospitals will need to spend
less money complying with needless rules. It also will lead to greater
ossification of CMS policy, which will create more stability in the market.
In short, Azar v. Allina Health Services was undoubtedly a hard pill
for CMS and HHS to swallow. However, requiring more rules to be made
through the notice-and-comment process will be good medicine for the
Medicare industry.
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